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1 Introduction	
Tampere	is	Finland’s	second-largest	city-region	after	the	capital	region.	Still,	from	the	Europe-
an	perspective,	it	is	at	most	a	middle-sized	city	located	in	the	far	north.	In	this	respect,	it	is	in-
triguing	that	Tampere	was	a	key	 location	when	the	Nokia	corporation	entered	an	era	of	 tre-
mendous	growth	due	to	its	digital	mobile	innovations.	Tampere	became	a	part	of	this	success	
story,	partly	because	of	its	strong	educational	and	research	basis	and	its	ability	to	grow	in	tan-
dem	with	Nokia’s	expansion,	especially	in	the	mobile	phone	business.	The	local	economic	and	
innovation	policies	were	also	geared	to	supporting	this	line	of	development.		
However,	Nokia’s	glorious	rise	and	the	era	of	dominance	of	more	than	decade	underwent	
an	 epic	 decline	 when	 Microsoft	 acquired	 and	 eventually	 terminated	 Nokia’s	 whole	 mobile	
business,	resulting	 in	thousands	of	redundancies	and	 lay-offs	 in	Tampere,	alongside	a	whole-
sale	change	in	the	ICT	industry.	Fortunately,	the	ICT	industry	seems	to	be	experiencing	a	new	
upsurge.	At	the	same	time,	the	way	to	conduct	local	development	policies	has	evolved,	having	
an	effect	on	research	and	education.	Furthermore,	there	are	signs	that	different	stakeholders	
have	been	able	to	strengthen	the	resilience	of	Tampere.		
From	this	point	of	departure,	the	main	aims	of	this	paper	are	(1)	to	examine	how	the	dif-
ferent	development	phases	of	the	local	ICT	industry	are	connected	to	the	evolution	of	its	resil-
ience	 capacity,	 (2)	 to	 analyse	 the	 ‘constructed	 resilience’,	 i.e.	 the	 intentional	 measures	 to	
strengthen	the	resilience	capacity	and	(3)	to	scrutinise	the	role	of	universities	in	relation	to	the	
development	stages	of	the	industry.	This	paper	argues	that	resilience	is	not	a	predefined	char-
acter	of	a	city	and	that	it	can	be	developed	through	strategic,	collaborative	measures		
In	this	paper,	case	methodology	is	applied	and	various	sources	of	data	are	drawn	upon.	The	
main	body	of	the	empirical	data	consists	of	standard	statistics	(Statistics	Finland);	73	daily	pa-
per	articles	(93	pages	from	Aamulehti,	the	main	local	newspaper);	six	extensive,	thematic	face-
to-face	interviews;	and	two	thematic	group	interviews.	In	addition	to	these	sets	of	data,	other	
written	and	electronic	materials	are	used.		
2 Setting	the	scene1	
2.1 The	roots	
Founded	 in	1779,	Tampere	 is	 Finland’s	 second-largest	 city-region	after	 the	capital	 region.	 Its	
population	 totals	 approximately	 380,000.	 Tampere	 has	 a	 long	 industrial	 history,	 and	 it	 can	
even	be	claimed	that	the	industrialisation	of	Finland	got	under	way	in	Tampere.	The	main	in-
dustrial	forces	of	Tampere	were	the	cotton	mills	and	paper	factories.	Later,	this	industrial	base	
expanded	 to	 include	 the	 textile	 industry	 and	 mechanical	 engineering,	 among	 others	 (see	
                                                
1	This	chapter	is	partly	based	on	Kolehmainen	(2003)	but	the	description	has	been	updated	and	revised.		
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Haapala	2005).	 The	 smoke-stack	 industries	 formed	 the	basis	of	 economic	development	until	
the	1990s,	when	Finland	was	hit	by	a	deep	recession.	This	was	a	turning	point	in	the	develop-
ment	of	 the	 industrial	structure.	Since	then,	 the	strategy	of	Tampere	has	been	to	modernise	
traditional	industries	and	to	develop	new	high-tech	industries	(Kostiainen	&	Sotarauta	2003).		
In	less	than	a	decade,	Finland	moved	from	being	one	of	the	least	ICT-specialised	countries	
to	one	of	the	most	specialised,	in	terms	of	exports,	production	and	research	and	development	
(R&D)	 (Boschma	 and	 Sotarauta	 2007).	 The	 extremely	 rapid	 shift	 of	 Finland	 to	 a	 knowledge-
based	 economy	 involved	 many	 coincidental	 factors	 and	 good	 timing.	 Although	 the	 pace	 of	
change	accelerated	 in	 the	1990s,	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	emergence	of	 the	 ICT	cluster	were	
already	laid	in	the	1900s.	Early	and	strong	competition	(including	the	presence	of	foreign	com-
panies,	such	as	Ericsson	and	Siemens),	demanding	customers	(network	operators),	standardi-
sation	(Nordic	Mobile	Telephone	Standard)	and	a	culture	open	to	new	technologies	contribut-
ed	significantly	to	the	evolution	of	the	ICT	cluster.	The	business	sector,	of	course,	played	a	key	
role	 in	 the	 cluster’s	 development,	 but	 the	 institutional	 setting	 and	 public	 policies	 have	 also	
been	major	factors	(Boschma	and	Sotarauta	2007:	169).	Geographically,	the	main	locations	of	
the	Finnish	ICT	cluster	were	Helsinki,	Tampere	and	Oulu.	
In	the	early	1990s,	there	was	only	a	clutch	of	separate	ICT-related	companies	in	Tampere.	
After	 that,	 the	agglomeration	grew	very	 rapidly.	 In	1996,	 the	 ICT	agglomeration	consisted	of	
approximately	170	companies	and	business	units,	with	a	total	of	5,200	employees	and	a	total	
turnover	of	about	770	million	euro.	In	2000,	total	turnover	had	doubled,	amounting	to	1.5	bil-
lion	euro.	The	rapid	development	of	the	agglomeration	resulted	largely	from	the	natural,	rapid	
development	of	the	ICT	sector.	For	example,	the	‘Internet	revolution’	in	the	mid-1990s	gener-
ated	 new	media	 business,	 which	 thereafter	 transformed	 drastically.	 Most	 of	 the	 ICT-sector	
growth	was	Nokia-led	in	the	Tampere	region.	In	addition	to	natural	growth,	ICT	has	been	one	
of	the	most	important	focus	areas	of	local	(business)	development,	innovation	and	higher	edu-
cation	policy	in	the	Tampere	city-region.	(Kolehmainen	2003)	
2.2 Higher	education	institutions		
The	 strong	 science	 and	 technology	 base	 and	 the	 educational	 institutions	 have	 been	 major	
strengths	of	the	ICT	cluster	in	Tampere.	The	most	important	institutions	in	this	respect	are	the	
Tampere	University	of	Technology	 (TUT),	 the	University	of	Tampere	(UTA)	and	Tampere	Uni-
versity	of	Applied	Sciences	(TAMK).	TUT	has	traditionally	had	very	close	relationships	with	local	
businesses,	both	in	terms	of	research	and	education.	In	terms	of	research,	TUT	has	had	several	
fields	of	research	that	have	contributed	to	the	ICT	industry	(e.g.	digital	signal	processing,	com-
puter	 science,	 software	systems).	 ICT-related	education	and	research	began	 to	strengthen	 in	
the	1980s,	when	computer	science	became	a	major	subject	at	TUT.	Since	then,	the	volumes	of	
information,	 communication	 and	 electro-technical	 education	 and	 research	 have	 grown	 very	
rapidly.	 In	 the	 late	1990s,	 there	was	a	dramatic	 increase	 in	 ICT-related	higher	education	and	
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research	nationwide	and	Nokia	was	naturally	a	central	player	in	this	respect	(e.g.	Häikiö	2002:	
91-93).		
UTA	has	its	roots	in	the	social	sciences,	but	today	it	is	a	diversified	university	with	approxi-
mately	11,900	first-degree	students	and	1,700	post-graduate	students.	Despite	its	emphasis	on	
the	 social	 sciences,	 UTA	 also	 has	 long	 traditions	 in	 computer	 science	 and	 other	 ICT-related	
fields	of	education	and	research.	UTA	started	teaching	activities	in	computer	science	in	1965,	
the	first	ever	in	Nordic	countries.	At	the	moment,	the	majority	of	the	ICT-related	subjects	are	
studied	in	the	Faculty	of	Communications	(COMS).	Human–computer	interaction	is	a	very	im-
portant	area	of	research	and	there	is	even	a	separate	Tampere	Unit	for	Computer-Human	In-
teraction	(TAUCHI)	for	this	purpose.	Correspondingly,	there	is	a	 long	tradition	in	digital	game	
research	at	UTA	(Kolehmainen	2003).	
TAMK	completes	the	operations	of	the	two	universities	in	Tampere.	It	 is	oriented	towards	
working	 life	 and	 RDI	 collaboration.	 TAMK	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 popular	 universities	 of	 applied	
sciences	 in	 Finland	 and	 has	 quite	 a	 strong	 focus	 on	 international	 education.	 Its	 diversified	
teaching	activities	support	in	many	ways	the	development	of	the	local	ICT	cluster,	although	it	is	
smaller	 than	 the	 two	universities.	 Currently,	 TAMK	has	 about	 10,000	 students	 and	720	 staff	
members.		
2.3 Regional	development	agencies	
ICT	industry	has	been	one	of	the	key	areas	of	local	business	development	and	innovation	poli-
cy	 in	Tampere	 for	more	 than	 two	decades.	 ICT	was	one	of	 the	new	 industries	 that	emerged	
when	 the	 traditional	 smoke-stack	 industries	 waned.	 Although	 the	 basic	 technological	
knowledge	and	other	competences	of	the	industry	lie	in	companies,	higher	education	institu-
tions	 and	 research	 institutes,	 competent	 business	 support,	 development	 and	 intermediation	
organisations	can	harness	these	competences	to	better	use	and	even	participate	in	the	process	
of	creating	new	regional	competences	and	governing	the	local	economic	restructuration.		
In	 the	 Finnish	 context,	 there	 are	 several	 public	 agencies	working	 together	 to	 boost	 local	
economic	 development.	 First,	 local	 government,	 i.e.	 cities	 and	municipalities,	 is	 very	 strong	
from	the	European	perspective.	For	example,	the	regional	councils	are	owned	by	the	cities	and	
municipalities	of	each	region,	even	though	they	serve	as	general	regional	development	author-
ities.	The	regional	councils	were	established	in	1994;	there	are	18	in	Finland.	In	recent	years,	
the	Council	of	Tampere	Region	has	become	very	active	in	respect	of	local	and	regional	innova-
tion	policy	and	has	promoted	open	innovation,	multidisciplinary	innovation	platforms	and	us-
er-driven	innovation.	In	addition,	it	is	coordinating	regional	foresight	activities.		
On	the	other	hand,	the	cities	and	municipalities	have	set	up	several	voluntary	organisations	
related	 to	economic	development	on	 their	own	or	with	other	actors.	Tampere	has	many	 in-
termediary	 organisations	 that	 have	 been	 concerned	 with	 stimulating	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
strong	knowledge-based	ICT	sector	with	collaborations	between	HEIs	and	firms.	Firstly,	its	local	
government	is	very	strong,	with	a	strong	city	government	but	also	a	regional	council	(general	
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regional	 development	 authorities	 owned	 by	 regional	 cities/municipalities).	 Tampere	 Region	
council	has	become	very	active	 in	 innovation	policy	promoting	e.g.	 innovation	platforms	and	
user	driven	innovation.	The	national	state	owns	Centre	for	Economic	Development,	Transport	
and	 the	 Environment	 (ELY	 Centres)	 in	 Tampere	 offering	 a	wide	 range	 of	 economic	 develop-
ment	 activities,	 including	 business	 support	 and	 employment	 services	 (advisory,	 training	 and	
expert	 services	and	 funding	 for	 investment	and	development	projects	etc.).	ELY	Centres	also	
administer	 Tekes	 (the	 Finnish	 Funding	Agency	 for	 Innovation)	 services	 in	 the	 region.	 The	 re-
gional	councils	and	ELY	Centres	will	be	amalgamated	in	2020.			
Cities	and	municipalities	have	also	set	up	 their	own	economic	development	organisations	
and	 networks.	 Tredea	 Ltd.	 or	 ‘Business	 Tampere’	 (Tampere	 Region	 Economic	 Development	
Agency),	was	 started	 in	 2009	 by	 the	 eight	municipalities	 of	 Tampere	 city-region.	 It	 provides	
support	 to	start-ups	and	potential	 inward	 investors	and	 is	active	 in	 the	execution	of	 interna-
tional	 talent	 attraction	 activities.	 All	 the	 activities	 have	been	 very	 important	 during	 the	dra-
matic	restructuring	of	the	ICT	industry.	Hermia	Group	is	more	focused,	established	in	1986	as	
Tamlink,	offering	specific	product	development	and	innovation	services	through	one	of	its	two	
subsidiaries,	 being	 Finland’s	 oldest	 technology	 transfer	 company	 linked	 to	 TUT	 both	 opera-
tionally	and	via	ownership.	The	other	subsidiary	-	Innovaatio	Oy	Uusi	Tehdas	Ltd	-	stems	from	
the	 Tampere	 Technology	 Centre	 which	 was	 established	 in	 1990	 to	 develop	 the	 Technology	
Centre	Hermia	founded	four	years	earlier	(see	Lehtimäki	2005).		
3 Path	creation	and	path	extension	in	the	Tampere	
region	
3.1 Path	creation:	Roots	grew	into	mature	business	
To	place	the	ICT	cluster	development	in	Tampere	into	a	theoretical	framework,	we	can	say	that	
Tampere	was	creating	its	ICT	path	in	the	1990s.	Path	creation	can	be	described	as	the	‘estab-
lishment	 of	 new	 firms	 in	 new	 sectors	 for	 the	 region	 or	 firms	 that	 have	 different	 variants	 of	
products,	employ	new	techniques,	organize	differently,	etc.	than	what	hitherto	have	dominat-
ed	in	the	region’	(Isaksen	2015:	588).	These	industries	can	be	either	new	to	the	region	or	en-
tirely	 new	 industries	 (Tödtling	 and	 Trippl	 2013),	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Tampere.	 Innovations,	
knowledge	base,	investments	and	structures	created	in	the	1990s	laid	the	basis	for	a	new	mo-
bile	industry	that	started	to	grow	rapidly.		
Path	 creation	 usually	 has	 two	 main	 streams:	 it	 may	 be	 caused	 by	 inward	 investments	
and/or	sectoral	diversification	of	existing	firms	through	path	branching,	or	 it	can	be	research	
driven,	 focusing	on	 the	commercialisation	of	 research	 results	 (Henning	et	al.	2013:	1353).	 In	
Tampere,	we	 can	 see	both	of	 these	paths.	Nokia	was	 an	 existing	 company	 that	 enlarged	 its	
product	scale	but	there	was	also	a	strong	contribution	from	basic	research.	Nokia	was	tightly	
integrated	into	the	local	research	ecosystem	in	the	1990s.	TUT	had	an	important	role	in	exper-
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imental	 basic	 research,	 standardisation	 and	 innovations	 that	 led	 the	way	 to	modern	mobile	
technology,	such	as	the	development	of	the	digital	signal	processing	needed	in	mobile	phones.	
As	mentioned	earlier,	the	volume	of	education,	especially	at	TUT,	grew	very	strongly	in	the	late	
1990s.	 In	 addition	 to	an	 increasingly	diverse	basic-degree	 and	post-graduate	education,	 TUT	
also	 offered	 in-service	 training	 and	 supplementary	 education	 for	 companies.	 Some	 of	 these	
courses	have	served	as	important	networking	forums	for	local	ICT	professionals	(Kolehmainen	
2003).	Path	creation	may	also	require	the	building	of	new	knowledge	organisations	and	institu-
tional	 change	 (Tödling	 and	 Trippl	 2013).	 We	 can	 see	 the	 establishment	 of	 Finland’s	 oldest	
technology	transfer	company	(Tamlink)	and	the	later	Hermia	Group	as	an	example	of	building	
such	institutional	capacity	in	the	Tampere	region	since	the	late	1980s.	
In	the	beginning	of	the	2000s,	the	basic	structure	of	the	ICT	cluster	had	matured	somewhat.	
The	business	structure	of	the	cluster	was	largely	dominated	by	the	business	units	of	large,	in-
ternational	ICT	companies,	such	as	Nokia,	TietoEnator,	Sonera	and	Fujitsu	Invia.	Nokia	Corpo-
ration	was	the	backbone	of	the	whole	cluster	for	a	long	time	and	its	story	will	be	dealt	with	in	
detail	later.	In	any	case,	the	ICT	cluster	was	and	still	is	oriented	towards	R&D,	a	concern	also	of	
the	above-mentioned	business	units	of	large	companies	(Kolehmainen	2003).	
The	large	companies	were	extremely	important	employers,	especially	in	the	later	1990s	and	
early	2000s,	but	the	dominant	role	of	those	companies	had	negative	side	effects	as	well.	For	
example,	one	of	the	major	weaknesses	of	the	ICT	cluster	was	a	debilitated	entrepreneurial	at-
mosphere,	which	was	linked	to	the	paucity	of	(new)	companies	aiming	at	fast	growth	and	in-
ternationalisation	 (cf.	 Autere	 2000).	 This	 feature	 was	 particularly	 striking	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
1990s,	when	the	ultimate	‘IT	hype’	occurred	in	Finland	and	many	new	companies	with	reckless	
objectives	were	founded.	On	the	other	hand,	Tampere	survived	quite	well	in	the	first	‘IT	reces-
sion’	at	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	when	the	‘dot.com	bubble’	burst	(Kolehmainen	2003).	The	
restructuration	of	the	ICT	cluster	took	place	almost	a	decade	later.		
3.2 Path	extension:	From	the	ultimate	boom	to	the	first	worrying	signs	
The	global	success	of	Nokia	mobile	phones	in	the	early	2000s	created	a	positive	circle.	There	
were	no	doubts,	however,	that	this	state	might	not	 last	forever.	This	eventually	 led	Tampere	
into	 a	 path	 extension,	 ‘in	which	 increasing	 returns	 and	 positive	 externalities	 reinforce	 local	
industrial	dynamism’	(Martin	and	Sunley	2006:	415).	In	path	extension	phase,	success	is	based	
on	incremental	innovations	in	the	existing	industry	(Hassink	2010a).	This	was	also	the	case	for	
Nokia	 and	Tampere	as	 they	 started	 to	 repeat	 the	patterns	of	 their	 success	based	on	mobile	
technology.	 Established	ways	 of	 doing	 things	 started	 to	 emerge.	 The	 logic	 of	 ‘increasing	 re-
turns’	 and	 ‘positive	 lock-in’	 started	 to	 take	 place.	 Both	 of	 these	 concepts	 refer	 to	 a	 state	 in	
which	the	current	circumstances	receive	positive	feedback	and	seem	productive.	This	leads	to	
a	self-reinforcing	circle	(Arthur	1989:	127;	Martin	and	Sunley	2006:	401-402).	
Interviews	conducted	in	the	Tampere	region	confirmed	the	existence	of	both	formal	and	in-
formal	 established	patterns	 of	 practice.	 TUT	 in	 particular	 created	 a	 special	 relationship	with	
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Nokia.	Visible	manifestations	of	co-operation	were	student	and	graduate	recruitment	to	Nokia,	
thesis	subjects,	the	indirect	effects	on	TUT’s	course	contents,	strong	personal	connections	and	
project	funding	from	Nokia.	In	some	years,	almost	complete	classes	of	graduates	were	recruit-
ed	by	Nokia	from	the	study	programme	of	Electronics	and	Communications	Engineering.	The	
special	 relationship	 with	 Nokia	 was	 very	 useful	 for	 TUT	 at	 this	 stage	 because	 Nokia	 was	 a	
stakeholder	 and	 a	 co-funder	 in	 almost	 every	 research	 project.	 With	 its	 global	 connections,	
Nokia	 also	 contributed	 to	 TUT’s	 internationalisation	process.	 At	 this	 point,	 co-operation	had	
matured	to	its	fullest	state.	TUT	‘didn’t	need	anyone	else’	and	they	were	‘looking	at	the	world	
through	blue	Nokia	 glasses’.	 Consequently,	 the	Nokia	 dominance	damaged	TUT’s	 other	 con-
nections	with	local	businesses	to	some	extent.		
The	setting	in	Tampere	and	TUT	started	to	change.	With	its	global	resources,	Nokia	was	the	
research	leader	in	communications	technology.	Over	time,	TUT	became	a	follower	that	provid-
ed	qualified	 labour	resources.	Nokia	started	to	 focus	more	on	product	development	 than	on	
basic	 research,	which	had	originally	been	 important	 in	 the	 collaboration	with	 the	university.	
Engineering	students	were	not	excited	about	entrepreneurship	because	Nokia	offered	attrac-
tive	 job	opportunities.	Still,	Nokia	was	not	 that	 strongly	embedded	 in	 the	 local	development	
system.	It	had	its	own	strong	global	Nokia	community,	networks	and	processes,	characterised	
by	a	closed	and	traditional	 innovation	process.	Nokia	also	had	a	positive	but	distant	attitude	
towards	 regional	 development	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 the	 eTampere	 Programme,	 an	 ambitious	
policy	programme	established	by	the	city	council	to	develop	the	local	information	society	and	
digitalisation	 in	 the	early	2000s.	There	were	also	 some	other	weak	 signals	of	 the	weakening	
embeddedness	of	Nokia	in	Tampere.	For	example,	most	of	Nokia’s	site	managers	in	Tampere	
were	not	very	visible	 in	 the	 regional	development	networks	despite	 the	huge	economic	 role	
that	 Nokia	 had	 in	 Tampere.	 It	 also	 worried	 some	 policy-makers	 that	 Nokia	 did	 not	 own	 its	
business	premises	in	Tampere,	but	that	may	have	been	the	case	at	least	partly	due	to	the	huge	
growth.		
Despite	some	warning	signals,	 this	 regional	economic	 lock-in	situation	could	be	described	
as	a	positive	lock-in	at	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	because	it	was	still	beneficial	to	everybody.	
According	 to	Martin	 (2012:	 12),	 regional	 economic	 resilience	 consists	 of	 a	 region’s	 ability	 to	
resist	recessionary	shocks,	its	ability	to	recover,	its	ability	to	renew	a	growth	path	and	its	abil-
ity	re-orientate.	Regional	resilience	in	the	Tampere	region	was	quietly	deteriorating,	however,	
because	of	the	increasing	dependency	on	one	significant	player	that	was,	after	all,	quite	pas-
sive	 in	 its	 local	 business	 community.	 Paradoxically,	 from	 the	 local	 policy-making	 view,	Nokia	
was	at	the	same	time	everywhere	and	nowhere.		
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4 Path	exhaustion:	Considerable	structural	changes	
4.1 Mobile	phone	businesses	of	Nokia	and	Microsoft	hit	the	wall2	
The	engineering	industry,	especially	mobile	phone	technology	development,	had	transformed	
the	industrial	scene	of	Tampere	over	the	1990s	and	the	industry	kept	growing	until	the	global	
economic	downturn	in	2008.	The	story	of	Nokia	Ltd.,	the	Tampere	region	and	all	of	Finland	as	a	
cutting-edge	 knowledge	 economy	 are	 closely	 intertwined.	 The	 role	 of	Nokia	 in	 the	 develop-
ment	of	economic	and	innovation	systems	in	Finland	has	been	vast.	In	2000,	Nokia	held	a	40%	
share	of	the	world’s	mobile	phone	market.	In	the	top	year,	2000,	Nokia	alone	produced	4%	of	
Finland’s	national	GDP.	From	2001	to	2007,	the	share	varied	between	2.9	and	3.8%.	Nokia	ac-
counted	 for	approximately	one-third	of	 total	Finnish	R&D	expenditure	 (2008)	and	a	 share	of	
exports	of	over	20%	(2000–2002).	Nokia’s	impact	on	Finland’s	GDP	decreased	dramatically	af-
ter	2007,	however,	and	was	even	negative	in	2012.	This	drop	naturally	had	large-scale	effects	
on	the	Finnish	economy,	employment	and	exports,	as	well	as	on	the	cities	where	Nokia	had	its	
facilities	(Ali-Yrkkö	2010;	Ali-Yrkkö,	Seppälä	and	Mattila	2016).		
Until	2008,	the	development	of	the	whole	ICT	industry	in	Finland,	 including	Tampere,	was	
quite	steady	and	positive.	The	first	visible	changes	in	the	structures	of	the	ICT	sector	of	Tampe-
re	occurred	at	the	same	time	as	the	global	economic	crisis	began.	The	amount	of	open	ICT	va-
cancies	started	to	decrease.	On	top	of	that,	in	2009,	Nokia	started	to	reduce	its	people	by	of-
fering	‘voluntary	separation	packages’.	These	were	the	first	signs	that	Nokia’s	mobile	business	
was	facing	major	trouble.	Those	who	were	working	in	Nokia	in	strategic	positions	saw	that	the	
outlook	was	anything	but	good.	At	the	time,	a	quite	substantial	number	of	Nokia’s	employees	
started	to	 look	 for	new	challenges.	Eventually,	Nokia	 laid	off	a	 few	hundred	people	over	 the	
next	two	years,	but	that	was	just	the	beginning.		
The	 radical	 measures	 began	 in	 early	 2011,	 when	 Nokia	 and	 its	 new	 CEO,	 Stephen	 Elop,	
started	to	make	strategic	changes.	To	compete	with	the	successful	Apple	iPhone,	Nokia	chose	
a	new	technological	platform,	 the	Microsoft	Windows	Phone,	 for	 smart	phones	and	gave	up	
developing	Symbian-	and	Linux-based	technologies.	In	the	new	situation,	many	of	the	experts	
were	found	to	have	inadequate	technological	competences.	This	shift	can	be	seen	as	the	turn-
ing	point,	after	which	 it	was	widely	 recognised	 that	major	 changes	were	going	on	 in	 the	 ICT	
business	 of	 Tampere.	Unfortunately,	 the	new	Windows	phones	 flopped	 in	 the	market.	Over	
the	next	 four	years,	Nokia	and	Nokia	Siemens	Networks	had	several	redundancy	cycles;	 they	
also	 outsourced	 people	 to	 other	 companies,	 such	 as	 Accenture.	 These	 actions	 concerned	 a	
couple	of	thousand	people	in	Tampere.	At	this	point,	it	was	self-evident	to	everyone	that	the	
ICT	industry	had	been	far	too	dependent	on	one	giant,	Nokia.	The	way	out	was	rough.		
                                                
2	We	have	compiled	the	milestones	of	Nokia-related	events	from	the	news	archives	of	the	local	daily	
newspaper	Aamulehti	and	from	regional	employment	authorities’	reports	(Salkoaho	2015).	
	 9	
Finally,	in	2014,	after	a	struggle	of	three	years,	Nokia	announced	that	it	would	sell	 its	mo-
bile	phone	business	to	Microsoft	and	concentrate	on	network	solutions,	location	services	and	
technology	 licencing.	 Staff	members	 in	mobile	 phone	 development	were	 transferred	 to	Mi-
crosoft.	 Two	more	 years	with	 constant	 struggle	 against	 falling	market	 shares	 and	 huge	 eco-
nomic	losses	were	ahead.	Then,	in	2016,	Microsoft	announced	that	it	would	be	ending	its	pro-
duction	of	Windows	phones	completely.	This	was	the	final	blow	for	the	mobile	phone	industry	
of	Tampere,	where	500	ICT	jobs	disappeared.	I	what	follows,	we	will	have	a	closer	look	at	the	
structural	changes	and	the	dimensions	of	the	regional	lock-in.		
4.2 Structural	changes	in	the	ICT	sector	of	Tampere	
The	 total	 unemployment	 rates	 in	 Tampere	 and	 the	 surrounding	 Tampere	 region	 have	 been	
above	the	national	average	since	2007	(Statistics	Finland	2016).	The	city	of	Tampere	had	the	
highest	unemployment	 rate	of	 the	 six	 largest	 cities	 in	Finland	 (City	of	Tampere	2016).	There	
were	close	to	4,000	employees	in	Nokia	Ltd	and	Nokia	Siemens	Networks	in	2009	in	Tampere,	
and	Nokia	was	the	biggest	employer	in	the	region	(City	of	Tampere	2011).	In	Figure	1,	we	can	
see	that	this	number	had	fallen	to	2,650	people	by	2011	and	800	people	by	2016.	The	share	of	
the	whole	 ICT	 sector	was	8.7%	of	 all	 employment	 in	 the	Tampere	 region	 (for	 Finland	 it	was	
6.3%)	in	2009,	falling	to	7.0%	(Finland	5.6%)	by	2015.	Despite	this	decreasing	share,	the	rela-
tive	significance	of	the	ICT	sector	 is	great	 in	Finland	as	a	whole	and	even	greater	 in	Tampere	
and	the	Tampere	region.	The	 loss	of	 ICT	 jobs	has	also	had	 indirect	effects	on	employment	 in	
other	sectors	because	they	provided	services	for	the	ICT	business.	
	
*	Statistics	Finland	(2016),	Statistics	Finland	(2013)	
**	2011:	Tampere	Chamber	of	Commerce	(2012:2),	2016:	Aamulehti	(2016)	
***	2011	May	and	2016	September	by	Neittaanmäki	&	Kinnunen	(2016:9)	
****	Ministry	of	Employment	and	the	Economy,	Sector	Online	(2016)	
FIGURE	1.	Some	aspects	of	the	ICT	employment	changes	in	the	Tampere	region.	
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In	 the	Tampere	 region,	 the	 total	number	of	 ICT-sector	employees	has	decreased	and	unem-
ployment	has	increased	(Figure	1).	In	2011,	the	ICT	sector	employed	nearly	10,000	people.	Five	
years	later,	the	jobs	of	3,000	people	had	been	restructured.	About	40%	of	these	people	were	
re-employed	relatively	quickly,	40%	were	engaged	in	subsidised	activities	(coaching,	retraining,	
entrepreneurship	courses)	and	20%	were	in	danger	of	long-term	unemployment	(Salkoaho	and	
Ikonen	 2015:	 8).	 Unemployment	 has	 been	 structural	 and	 problematic	 among	 those	 people	
who	have	only	 a	 secondary-level	 vocational	 education;	 they	 form	 two-thirds	of	 unemployed	
ICT-educated	people.	New	vacancies	require	high-level	technology	competences.	Unemployed	
middle	 management	 is	 another	 group	 that	 is	 facing	 challenges	 in	 finding	 new	 work	
(Neittaanmäki	and	Kinnunen	2016:	21).	
The	ICT	sector	has	been	going	through	a	structural	change.	Redundancies	in	the	mobile	sec-
tor	are	only	one	aspect	of	this	development.	A	new	wave	of	software	small	and	medium	en-
terprises	 (SMEs)	and	a	 few	 larger	actors	have	emerged.	 In	addition,	 ICT	 specialists	are	being	
employed	by	the	more	traditional	 industrial	sectors,	which	have	been	going	through	a	trans-
formation	 in	the	direction	of	utilising	smart	technologies.	During	the	recession,	many	ICT	en-
terprises	have	been	recruiting	specialists	constantly.	Their	message	has	actually	been	that	they	
need	a	greater	number	of	skilful	software	developers.	Many	of	the	new	vacancies	are	created	
by	 SMEs,	who	 are	 recruiting	 technical	 and	 sales	 specialists	 rather	 than	 the	middle	manage-
ment	that	was	a	large	group	in	Nokia.	There	is	a	great	need	for	the	updating	of	technological	
skills	 through	supplementary	education.	Moreover,	 some	 international	 companies	have	seen	
their	chance	to	recruit	skilful	labour	and	have	established	units	in	Tampere	(e.g.	Intel,	Huawei).	
Once	 again,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 deficit	 in	 technological	 experts,	 especially	 in	 the	 software	
business	(Aamulehti	news	archives).	Nonetheless,	 the	existing	 ICT	companies	 in	the	Tampere	
region	are	growing.	In	2016,	they	estimated	that	altogether	they	would	recruit	over	700	new	
people.	Among	 the	companies	 implementing	 recruitment	programmes	of	approximately	100	
people	are	Solita,	Vincit,	M-Files	and	Gofore	(Tampere	Chamber	of	Commerce	2016:	19).	The	
coexistence	of	unemployment	and	numerous	unfilled	vacancies	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	a	mis-
match	between	labour	supply	and	demand.	
In	addition	to	the	changes	in	the	local	labour	market,	the	restructuring	of	the	Tampere	ICT	
cluster	becomes	visible	 in	 the	changes	 in	companies’	 turnover,	 the	 focus	of	 industry	and	the	
establishment	of	new	companies.	The	overall	turnover	volume	of	current	ICT	companies	in	the	
Tampere	region	is	still	low	compared	to	the	volume	of	the	Nokia	days	(Figure	2).	
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Data	source:	Statistics	Finland	2016	
FIGURE	2.	Turnover	development	of	the	ICT	sector	in	the	Tampere	region.		
The	 business	 structure	 of	 the	 ICT	 industry	 in	 Tampere	 and	 the	 Tampere	 region	 has	 also	
changed.	There	are	more	SMEs	and	the	focus	has	moved	from	hardware	production	(mobile	
phones)	towards	software	development.	The	number	of	ICT	companies	or	their	local	units	has	
grown	from	720	to	859	between	2007	and	2015	(Statistics	Finland	2016).	Exports,	which	used	
to	be	a	strength	 in	the	Tampere	region,	have	been	low	for	several	years	and	have	recovered	
rather	slowly.	The	challenge	is	to	internationalise	the	growing	software	field	and	make	a	shift	
from	exporting	consumer	goods	to	immaterial	services.	The	new	ICT	business	is	versatile	and	a	
lot	 of	 potential	 is	 identified	 in	 the	 games	 industry,	 web	 applications,	 cloud	 solutions,	 cyber	
safety,	health	technology,	location-based	services	and	the	digitalisation	of	all	kinds	of	services	
and	traditional	industry	(Aamulehti	news	archives).		
Universities	in	Tampere	experienced	the	effects	of	ICT	restructuration,	as	described	by	the	
interviewees.	 Students	were	 no	 longer	 so	 interested	 in	 applying	 to	 study	 the	 programme	 in	
Electronics	 and	 Communications	 Engineering	 at	 TUT	 and	 intakes	were	 reduced.	 By	 contrast,	
electrical	energy	engineering	has	grown	in	popularity.	The	contents	of	study	programmes	were	
not	notably	altered,	however.	TUT	 faced	a	 situation	where	external	 funding	diminished	con-
siderably.	For	years,	Nokia	was	the	most	significant	research	partner.	Ongoing	projects	lasted	
for	 a	 couple	of	 years,	which	 gave	 time	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	new	 circumstances.	 Competition	 for	
funding	sources	became	more	intense.	TUT	started	to	reach	out	to	new	project	partners	and	
opened	up	 to	a	new	kind	of	 collaboration.	The	new	wave	of	 ICT	 companies	has	had	a	more	
open	approach	to	co-operation;	for	example,	companies	have	been	interested	in	utilising	stu-
dents	as	an	innovation	resource.	
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4.3 Dimensions	of	the	regional	lock-in	in	Tampere	
Next,	we	will	outline	the	reasons	behind	the	rapid	changes	in	the	Tampere	region.	To	put	the	
development	into	the	framework	of	path	dependency,	it	can	be	said	that	Tampere	was	driven	
into	a	state	of	 lock-in.	The	success	of	Tampere	was	closely	connected	with	the	mobile	phone	
industry	and	this	regional	path	encountered	rapid	exhaustion.	Hassink	(2010b)	describes	path	
exhaustion	as	a	state	in	which	the	innovation	potential	of	local	firms	has	been	reduced	or	in-
novations	are	restricted	to	a	specific	technological	path;	regional	industry	has	low	adaptability	
with	regard	to	technological	and	market	changes.	Martin	and	Sunley	(2006:	415)	describe	lock-
in	as	a	 situation	 in	which	a	 technology,	 industry	or	 regional	economy	has	become	stuck	 in	a	
particular	trajectory	or	path	that	has	become	inefficient	in	some	way.	
Because	Nokia	was	the	most	significant	single	factor	in	shaping	the	ICT	cluster	in	Tampere,	
we	take	a	closer	look	at	the	principal	reasons	identified	for	its	decline.	Laamanen	et	al.	(2016:	
13-17)	have	analysed	the	discourses	around	Nokia’s	failure.	They	outlined	four	categories	that	
were	 identified	 as	 problems:	 (1)	 wrong	 strategic	 choices	 (e.g.	 technology,	 timing,	 people	 in	
leading	positions,	neglect	of	 innovations	and	products	 that	could	have	been	triumphant);	 (2)	
lack	of	the	capabilities	to	face	new	challenges;	(3)	organisational	design	(e.g.	inflexibility,	struc-
tures	 that	 prevented	 efficient	 R&D);	 and	 (4)	 environmental	 factors,	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 the	
market	and	the	economic	downshift.		
According	to	the	interviews,	the	ICT	industry	in	Tampere	shared	similar	problems:	it	as	una-
ble	 to	 understand	market	 requirements	 and	 compete	with	 iPhone;	 Nokia’s	 organisation	 be-
came	too	massive,	bureaucratic	and	slow;	Nokia	had	a	traditional	innovation	process;	and	the	
globally	difficult	economic	situation.	A	larger	context	was	also	delineated:	‘The	time	of	the	di-
nosaurs	was	over’,	‘It	was	time	for	new	and	more	agile	companies’	and	‘creative	destruction’.	
We	can	 see	 correspondence	here	with	 the	attributes	of	path	exhaustion	and	organisational-
level	 reasons	 for	 failure.	What	happened	with	Nokia’s	organisation	was	 intertwined	with	the	
path	of	Tampere,	although	the	effect	was	mostly	one-way.	In	the	local	context,	there	were	no	
instruments	to	 intervene	 in	the	global	company’s	choices	or	significantly	help	 it	to	overcome	
difficulties.	In	the	regional	context,	by	contrast,	the	global	company	had	a	large	effect.	
On	 the	 regional	 level,	 lock-in	 can	 be	 seen	 from	many	 different	 perspectives.	Martin	 and	
Sunley	 (2006:	400)	 summarise	 the	aspects	of	path	dependency:	 (1)	 technological	 lock-in;	 (2)	
dynamic	increasing	returns,	in	which	positive	feedback	reinforces	existing	paths;	and	(3)	insti-
tutional	hysteresis,	in	which	formal	and	informal	institutions,	social	arrangements	and	cultural	
forms	self-reproduce	themselves.	Interviewees	saw	that	the	external	forces	(like	Nokia’s	situa-
tion	and	the	global	economic	conditions)	were	not	the	only	reason	for	the	problems	of	the	ICT	
business	in	Tampere	and	that	regional	actors	played	their	own	role.	Technological	lock-in	can	
be	seen	at	the	regional	level	in	the	highly	specialised	labour.	Competences	in	mobile	technolo-
gy	were	high	but	narrow.	Dynamic	increasing	returns	encouraged	different	actors,	such	as	the	
city	and	the	universities,	to	invest	in	Nokia-related	development	because	it	was	economically	
beneficial.	Regional	actors	 failed	to	build	a	 larger	 industrial	basis	 in	 the	 ICT	sector	and	relied	
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too	much	on	one	pillar.	 Institutional	hysteresis	can	be	seen	in	Tampere	as	well.	For	example,	
there	were	established	forms	of	university–Nokia	collaboration	and	behavioural	patterns,	such	
as	the	engineering	students’	obvious	career	paths	to	Nokia.	People	working	in	Nokia	also	had	
limited	personal	networks	 that	did	not	 integrate	with	 the	other	 local	 industry	networks.	Re-
gional	resilience	was	not	constructed	as	systematically	as	it	could	have	been.		
The	literature	on	regional	lock-ins	usually	focuses	on	old	and	mono-structural	industrial	re-
gions	(Hassink	2010b).	The	case	of	Tampere	 is	exceptional	because	 it	 is	an	example	of	trans-
formation	occurring	 in	 the	 information	 age.	 Changes	 in	 new,	 knowledge-intensive	 industries	
can	be	very	fast.	In	Tampere,	restructuring	took	place	rapidly	and	in	a	crisis.	David	(2001:	26-
27)	suggests	that	sometimes,	when	endogenous	development	ceases,	an	external	shock	is	re-
quired	to	shake	the	region	out	of	its	lock-in.	Martin	and	Sunley	(2006:	406)	see	this	as	an	over-
ly	 radical	 interpretation	and	 it	 is	 true	that	such	a	shock	 is	not	always	needed.	 In	Tampere,	 it	
cannot	be	said	that	endogenous	development	would	have	totally	ceased	but	it	may	have	been	
interrupted.	 The	de-locking	process	was	 rough	but	necessary.	One	development	manager	 in	
the	city	of	Tampere	even	said	that	‘Nokia	and	Microsoft	downsizing	and	shutdowns	were	the	
best	things	that	have	happened	to	Tampere	after	all’.	Simultaneously,	as	one	path	was	coming	
to	an	end,	new	paths	were	already	starting	to	emerge.	New	ICT	SMEs	were	established	and	the	
old	machine	 industry	was	modernised	 from	the	 inside.	Next,	we	 look	at	 the	procedures	 that	
were	 launched	to	help	the	restructuring	of	the	 ICT	sector	 in	the	Tampere	region	and	to	con-
sciously	construct	regional	resilience.	
	
5 Path	branching	by	deepening,	open	collaboration	
5.1 Actions	before	the	crisis	
Not	all	of	 the	actions	to	reshape	the	 industrial	scene	of	Tampere	were	reactive	responses	to	
the	 immediate	 crisis.	 A	 lot	 had	 already	 been	 done	 to	 promote	 innovation	 and	 SMEs	 in	 the	
years	2008–2009.	Innovaatio	Oy	Uusi	Tehdas	Ltd.	was	running	its	‘New	Factory’	in	the	historic	
heart	 of	 Tampere.	 This	was	 a	 business	 incubator	 and	 an	 innovation	 centre	 or	 platform	 that	
aimed	to	‘connect	entrepreneurs,	students,	researchers,	mentors,	investors	and	experts	from	
various	 fields	 into	 value	 co-creation’.	 In	 this	 respect,	 a	 concept	 called	 ‘Demola’	 has	 become	
quite	prominent.	Established	in	Tampere	in	2008	and	now	operating	in	13	locations	worldwide	
following	convergent	operating	principles,	Demola	is	a	student	innovation	project	platform	on	
which	multidisciplinary	and	often	multinational	student	teams	solve	real-world	challenges	pro-
vided	 by	 companies	 and	 other	 organisations.	 The	 results	 of	 these	 projects	 are	 concepts,	
demonstrations	and	prototypes.	The	striking	feature	of	this	concept	is	that	the	student	teams	
remain	the	immaterial	property	owners.	Thus,	the	teams	can	benefit	from	their	work	not	only	
as	 academic	 credits	 and	experience	but	 also	 financially.	 The	 teams	may	even	establish	 their	
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own	start-ups.	Because	Demola	is	linked	to	students	and	studying,	in	Tampere,	TUT,	UTA	and	
TAMK,	together	with	city	of	Tampere,	have	become	the	actual	owners	of	Demola	activities.	
The	New	 Factory	 is	 also	 a	 start-up	 incubator	 or	 accelerator	 for	 beginning	 entrepreneurs.	
The	 results	 of	 the	 New	 Factory	 are	 quite	 impressive;	 more	 than	 160	 established	 start-ups,	
1,600	jobs	created	and	35	million	euro	in	raised	funding.	The	roots	of	the	New	Factory’s	start-
up	activity	are	in	the	so-called	‘Protomo’	concept,	which	was	established	in	2009.	The	key	idea	
was	 to	 facilitate	 the	 birth	 of	 new	 start-up	 companies	 by	 bringing	 together	 newly	 graduated	
university	 students	 and	 highly	 educated	 unemployed	 people,	 such	 as	 people	 laid	 off	 from	
Nokia.	The	idea	was	quite	explicitly	to	govern	the	structural	change	of	the	local	economy	and	
to	alleviate	its	negative	consequences.	The	first	signs	of	that	change	became	apparent	in	2008	
and	 2009.	 Protomo	was	 a	 community-based,	 networked	 pre-incubator	 for	 those	 individuals	
and	 teams	who	were	 interested	 in	entrepreneurship.	The	Protomo	concept	was	 financed	by	
the	Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Affairs	 and	 Employment,	 the	 Finnish	 Innovation	 Fund	 and	 several	
cities	in	which	the	Protomo	concept	was	executed.		
5.2 Acute	crisis	management	
The	year	2011	was	a	turning	point	in	the	transformation	of	the	ICT	sector	of	the	Tampere	re-
gion.	Nokia’s	announcement	of	major	shifts	 in	 its	mobile	phone	platforms	left	 large	numbers	
of	specialists	unemployed	but	signals	about	change	had	existed	even	before	that.	There	was	a	
rising	consciousness	that	the	successful	mobile	phone	path	of	Tampere	was	beginning	to	dete-
riorate	and	 that	a	new	path	 should	be	 created.	Universities,	development	organisations	and	
other	regional	actors	managed	to	respond	quickly	to	the	new	situation.	The	reason	for	this	is	
explained	by	Salkoaho	and	Ikonen	(2015:	9):	a	loose	co-operation	network	already	existed	and	
in	the	spring	of	2011	it	was	assembled	into	a	tight	group	of	core	actors:	the	city	of	Tampere,	
the	council	of	Tampere	region	(statutory	joint	municipal	authority),	Tekes	(the	Finnish	Funding	
Agency	 for	Technology	and	 Innovation	 [state]),	Pirkanmaa	ELY	Centre	 (state),	 the	 innovation	
and	 product	 development	 expert	 Hermia	 Group	 (technology	 centre/innovation	 company),	
Tredea	 (RDA	 owned	 by	municipalities),	 the	 Tampere	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 TUT,	 UTA	 and	
Nokia	Ltd.		
These	 organisations	 started	 to	meet	 in	 so-called	 ‘Breakfast	Meetings’	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.	
The	group	was	unofficial	 in	nature	and	consisted	of	a	 team	of	experts	and	 influential	 figures	
from	different	organisations.	The	group’s	aim	was	to	reflect	on	the	possibilities	of	co-operation	
between	 public	 bodies	 and	 private	 enterprises	 amidst	 ongoing	 structural	 changes	 (Salkoaho	
2015:	 9).	 Research	 interviews	 confirmed	 that	 this	 group	 had	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 crisis	man-
agement	and	coordination.	The	group	was	based	on	mutual	 trust	and	a	common	will	 to	 find	
solutions.	 There	 was	 even	 confidential	 information	 exchanged	 about	 redundancies	 so	 that	
employment	officials	were	able	to	prepare	for	new	waves	of	unemployment	and	to	plan	their	
next	steps.	This	group	had	no	official	leader	but	was	called	together	by	Tredea.	The	lack	of	offi-
cial	leadership	was	not	generally	seen	as	a	problem	but	as	a	natural	state	in	a	network	where	
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all	 these	 organisations	 had	 their	 own	 roles.	 One	 concrete	 example	 of	 the	 co-operation	 be-
tween	regional	actors	in	the	Tampere	region	has	been	the	RecruIT	Tampere	recruitment	event,	
which	was	 started	 in	 2011	 and	 became	 a	 regular	 event.	 It	 has	 established	 its	 position	 as	 a	
meeting	point	for	ICT-sector	companies	and	professionals.	
The	ELY	Centre	played	a	responsible	role	as	a	regional	state	authority	in	charge	of	employ-
ment	 issues	 and	 supplying	 financial	 resources	 to	manage	 unemployment.	 It	 led	 a	 project	 to	
prepare	 an	 action	plan	 to	minimise	 the	damage	 caused	by	 redundancies	 and	 carried	out	 an	
extensive	survey	of	ICT	competence	needed	by	business	in	the	region.	On	the	basis	of	this	in-
formation,	a	large	ICT	retraining	and	qualifications	upgrading	umbrella	programme,	Spirit	–	ICT	
Future	in	the	Tampere	Region,	was	launched.	Spirit	supplied	updating	training	courses	and	ed-
ucation	with	resources	from,	for	example,	the	European	Union	European	Social	Fund	and	Eu-
ropean	Globalisation	 Fund.	 Spirit	was	 the	 public	 complementary	 instrument	 to	Nokia’s	 own	
large	Bridge	programme.	Approximately	2,000	people	and	20	companies	participated	in	Spirit	
retraining	and	upgrading	of	qualifications	(Salkoaho	and	Ikonen	2015:	8).	
Nokia	showed	previously	unseen	social	 responsibility	with	 its	global	Bridge	programme	 in	
the	years	2011–2014	for	its	employees	who	were	laid	off	or	in	danger	of	becoming	redundant.	
There	was	also	a	more	business-based	reason	behind	the	programme,	however.	Nokia’s	stra-
tegic	motivation	was	‘not	to	make	another	Bochum’,	a	phrase	that	referred	to	Nokia’s	Bochum	
factory	shutdown	in	Germany,	which	caused	huge	negative	publicity	and	damage	to	the	com-
pany’s	reputation.	The	five	different	Nokia	Bridge	paths	were	(1)	a	new	job	inside	Nokia,	(2)	a	
new	job	outside	Nokia,	(3)	start-up	entrepreneurship,	(4)	retraining,	and	(5)	finding	one’s	own	
personal	path.	The	interest	in	entrepreneurship	surprised	everybody.	Nokia	provided	10,000–
25,000	euro	grants	and	technology	licencing	to	those	who	wanted	to	start	their	own	business-
es.	Bridge	start-up	evaluation,	conducted	by	Aalto	University	(Kiuru,	Handelberg	and	Rannikko	
2013;	 Eskelinen	2015:	 24-25),	 showed	 that	 the	programme	had	 good	 results.	Approximately	
100	new	businesses	were	established	by	550	people	in	Tampere.	The	range	of	companies	di-
versified	 from	 ICT	 (40%)	 into	 multiple	 branches.	 After	 the	 Bridge	 project,	 Microsoft	 imple-
mented	a	similar	programme	called	Polku	(‘Path’)	when	they	began	their	redundancies.	Polku	
has	also	had	a	positive	reception.		
Universities	 had	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 restructuration	 process.	 They	 provided	 supple-
mentary	 education,	 conducted	 in	 co-operation	 with	 Nokia’s	 Bridge	 and	 Spirit	 programmes.	
According	 to	 interviewees,	a	new	kind	of	 collaborative	 thinking	also	emerged	 in	universities.	
TUT,	UTA,	and	TAMK	started	to	co-operate	more	closely	because	they	needed	to	coordinate	
supplementary	education	to	unite	competences	and	create	efficient	training	modules	togeth-
er.	Another	 reason	 to	 co-operate	was	 that	 they	wanted	 to	be	more	 competitive	against	pri-
vate-sector	education	providers	 in	public	tenders.	TUT	has	also	contributed	to	the	success	of	
new	ICT	companies	 in	the	region	by	being	more	active	 in	reaching	out	to	new	research	part-
ners.		
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There	was	a	shared	concern	about	the	crisis	 in	the	mobile	phone	industry	 in	Tampere.	All	
the	regional	players	felt	that	they	were	in	the	same	boat.	For	that	reason,	it	is	difficult	to	iden-
tify	any	actual	conflicts	between	the	regional	partners	 in	 the	attempts	to	solve	the	problem.	
Interviewees	 indicated	 that	 there	 was	 a	 consensus	 among	 organisations	 about	 the	 general	
strategic	lines.	Some	different	emphasis	occurred	on	smaller	issues,	however.	For	example,	the	
universities	would	have	been	 interested	 in	producing	a	broader	and	more	general	upgrading	
education.	The	employment	authorities	saw	that	there	was	a	greater	need	for	brief	and	highly	
specialised	few-day	courses	on	new	technologies,	however.	Both	models	were	carried	out	but	
the	emphasis	was	placed	on	specialised	quick	courses.	
Universities,	especially	TUT,	needed	to	find	new	research	partners	to	fill	the	gap	that	Nokia	
had	left.	The	competition	for	funding	also	became	more	intense.	New	companions	were	found	
but	starting	a	collaboration	 is	never	simple.	 It	 takes	time	to	adapt	to	new	organisational	cul-
tures.	In	some	cases,	a	lot	of	work	was	carried	out	to	establish	a	relationship	and	it	was	disap-
pointing	when	it	did	not	work	out	or	the	company	simply	left	the	Tampere	region	before	the	
relationship	was	even	created.	Nevertheless,	a	new	university–business	network	has	formed	in	
recent	years.		
The	city	of	Tampere	and	regional	development	agency	Tredea	worked	in	the	field	of	indus-
trial	development	policy.	Their	task	was	to	help	generate	new	business	by	the	Invest	in	Tampe-
re	programme,	by	supporting	start-ups	and	by	providing	growth	services.	An	important	strate-
gy	was	to	promote	Tampere	as	an	attractive	site	for	global	and	national	companies,	especially	
for	the	ICT	sector.	A	key	argument	was	that	there	was	not	only	a	substantial	amount	of	quali-
fied	labour	available	but	also	high-quality	physical	 infrastructure	and	research	institutions.	At	
the	time	of	large	redundancies,	entire	development	teams	became	available.	Tredea	was	mar-
keting	 the	 added	 value	 of	 hiring	 teams.	 Intel	 was	 one	 of	 the	 rare	 newcomers	 to	 arrived	 in	
Tampere	 on	 time	 and	managed	 to	 recruit	MeeGo	 teams	 before	 they	were	 scattered.	 There	
have	been	other	global	corporations	that	established	a	business	site	in	Tampere	but	not	all	of	
them	stayed	permanently	(Ericsson	and	Broadcom).	One	interpretation	made	by	an	interview-
ee	was	that	 they	only	wanted	to	utilise	 labour	resources	and	did	not	 truly	 integrate	 into	the	
regional	ecosystem.		
Public	 actors	 cannot	 revitalise	 a	 regional	 business	 ecosystem	 by	 themselves.	 Enterprises	
have	the	key	role	in	renewal.	This	renewal	appeared	as	new	companies	were	established	from	
the	 ashes	 of	 Nokia	 and	 Microsoft.	 These	 next-generation	 ICT	 companies	 are	 pursuing	 new	
kinds	of	strategy	that	rely	on	a	lack	of	hierarchical	structures,	openness	and	transparency,	con-
tinuous	learning,	crowdsourcing,	and	ethical	and	meaningful	assignments	(Kärki	2015:	16).	This	
opens	up	possibilities	for	networking	in	new	ways.	The	new	ICT	businesses	are	also	more	ver-
satile	 than	before	 (e.g.	 games	 industry,	 cloud	 solutions,	 cyber	 safety,	 health	 technology	 and	
digitalisation	of	traditional	industry).	
Nokia	did	not	disappear	from	the	business	ecosystem	either.	It	fell	out	of	the	list	of	the	ten	
most	value-adding	companies	of	Finland	but	it	has	made	an	impressive	comeback	as	a	network	
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company,	rising	to	the	first	position	in	2015.	Still,	the	significance	of	Nokia	as	a	whole	has	de-
creased.	It	does	not	hold	the	first	position	of	most	value-adding	companies	when	indirect	ef-
fects	are	 taken	 into	account	because	Nokia	no	 longer	has	 such	a	dominant	 role	 in	 the	value	
chain	 (Ali-Yrkkö,	Seppälä	and	Mattila	2016:	3-4).	As	an	 interesting	detail,	Nokia	has	quite	 re-
cently	re-entered	the	mobile	phone	business	by	following	an	entirely	new	business	approach:	
It	 is	 not	 designing	 or	 manufacturing	 mobile	 phones,	 but	 has	 licensed	 the	 Nokia	 brand	 for	
phones	and	tablets	to	HMD	Global	Ltd.	From	the	point	of	view	of	Nokia,	this	is	a	low-risk	but,	
at	best,	very	profitable	strategy.		
5.3 Path	renewal	by	diversification	
The	concept	of	path	branching	 can	be	used	to	describe	and	give	a	 theoretical	 framework	 to	
efforts	conducted	in	Tampere	during	the	restructuration	process.	Path	branching	is	a	situation	
in	which	existing	local	firms	and	industries	shift	to	different	but	related	sectors	(Boschma	and	
Frenken	2011).	Regions	usually	branch	 into	 industries	 that	are	 technologically	 related	 to	 the	
pre-existing	industries	in	the	regions	(Neffke	et	al.	2011:	237).	In	Tampere,	the	mobile	phone	
industry	 diversified	 into	 other	 ICT	 sectors	 and	 merged	 with	 traditional	 industries	 as	 smart	
technologies.	Lester	(2007:	17-18)	has	introduced	a	typology	of	industrial	transformation	pro-
cesses	 in	which	he	 identifies	 four	different	means	of	 transformation:	 (1)	 indigenous	creation	
(new	technologies),	(2)	transplantation	from	elsewhere	(of	ideas	new	to	the	region,	(3)	diversi-
fication	into	technologically	related	industries	and	(4)	upgrading	of	existing	industries.	It	is	easy	
to	see	that	Tampere	adopted	the	latter	two	means.	
Path	 branching	 is	 often	 seen	 as	 industry	 driven	 (Neffke	 et	 al.	 2011:	 237).	 Drawing	 upon	
Garud	et	al.	(2010),	we	want	to	emphasise	the	power	of	reflexive	agency	and	the	cumulative	
processes	of	gradual	change	as	forces	in	path	creation	(or,	in	this	case,	path	renewal),	and	thus	
also	in	resilience.	By	linking	the	concept	of	resilience	to	the	conceptual	framework	provided	by	
path	 dependency,	we	might	 be	 able	 to	 add	 analytical	 leverage	 to	 the	 efforts	 to	 understand	
how	 regions	might	 escape	 their	 past	 and	 open	 up	 new	 paths.	 As	 Garud	 and	 Karnøe	 (2001)	
highlight,	the	initial	conditions	are	not	given,	as	assumed	in	path	dependency	studies,	but	are	
constructed	by	actors.	Therefore,	various	incidents	shaping	paths	ought	not	to	be	approached	
as	exogenous	and	as	manifesting	something	unpredictable,	non-purposive	and	random	but	as	
emergent	 and	 serving	 as	 embedded	 contexts	 for	 agency.	 Garud	 and	 Karnøe’s	 framework	
stresses	the	role	of	entrepreneurs	although,	as	Djelic	and	Quack	(2007)	maintain,	path	devel-
opment	is	also	political	by	nature,	and	new	paths	may	emerge	as	a	result	of	the	entrepreneur-
ial	efforts	of	 science	and	policy	actors	despite	 the	 lack	of	business	entrepreneurs	 (Sotarauta	
and	Mustikkamäki	2015;	Sotarauta	and	Suvinen,	2018).	The	many	self-reinforcing	mechanisms	
framing	regional	resilience	are	thus	strategically	manipulated	and	not	only	given	from	the	out-
side,	as	we	can	see	in	the	case	of	Tampere.		
Universities	have	been	an	important	resource	in	crisis	management	but	perhaps	they	have	
an	even	greater	 role	 as	 long-term	competence	builders.	Universities’	 role	 in	building	human	
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capital	for	the	region	in	general	cannot	be	underestimated.	For	example,	Crescenzi,	Luca	and	
Milio	 (2015)	 have	 stated	 that	 human	 capital,	 especially	 tertiary	 educational	 attainment,	 is	 a	
strong	predictor	of	regional	growth,	innovation	and	resilience.	The	resilience-building	role	of	a	
university	education	has	also	become	apparent	 in	Tampere;	 the	employment	 rates	of	highly	
educated	ICT	individuals	have	been	considerably	lower	than	those	with	only	a	secondary-level	
education	(Neittaanmäki	and	Kinnunen	2016:	21).	
Over	the	course	of	managing	the	crisis,	regional	actors	have	strengthened	their	collabora-
tion	in	Tampere.	Informal	core	group	meetings	to	coordinate	the	restructuration	process	were	
an	indication	of	a	new	kind	of	working	approach	that	reflected	the	ideas	of	collaboration	and	
openness.	This	shift	in	attitudes	played	an	important	role	in	constructing	regional	resilience.	As	
Bristow	and	Healy	 (2014:	97-98)	point	out,	 the	networked	and	polycentric	nature	of	govern-
ance	and	policy	is	critical	in	resilience.	Interviewed	people	who	had	participated	in	the	restruc-
turing	processes	 identified	some	changes	 in	 local	development	 thinking.	Development	policy	
practiced	in	the	Tampere	region	has	shifted	from	cluster	and	sector	development	towards	in-
creasingly	cross-sectional	thinking.	There	has	been	an	effort	to	find	themes	that	are	common	
to	all	industries,	such	as	‘smartness’,	which	refers	to	the	digitalisation	of	all	kinds	of	processes	
and	products.	 In	addition,	 some	other	 fields	of	 local	development	policy,	 such	as	 the	 talent-
attraction	policy,	have	been	reshaped	to	increase	human	diversity	and	global	linkages.		
5.4 Building	the	future	
	‘Smartness’	also	concerns	the	city	itself.	The	city	of	Tampere	has	launched	a	new	Smart	Tam-
pere	programme	(2017–2021),	the	key	idea	of	which	is	to	open	big,	digitalisation-related	chal-
lenges	 of	 the	 city	 to	 be	 solved	 using	 innovative	 solutions	 by	 different	 stakeholders,	 such	 as	
companies,	 universities	 and	 citizens.	 The	 first	 seven	 themes	 of	 Smart	 Tampere	 are	 Smart	
Health,	Smart	Education,	Smart	Industry,	Smart	Building,	Smart	Infrastructure,	Smart	Mobility	
and	 Smart	 Government	 and	 Citizen.	 Through	 this	 programme,	 the	 city-organisation	 tries	 to	
find	new	ways	to	interact	with	different	parties;	it	is	not	only	about	networking	parties	or	con-
ducting	innovative	public	procurement,	however,	but	placing	the	city	as	a	living	testing	ground	
for	 many	 kinds	 of	 experimentation.	 This	 calls	 for	 many	 new	 kinds	 of	 role	 for	 the	 city-
organisation	 (see	 Figure	 3).	 Despite	many	 problems	 (e.g.	 the	 high	 unemployment	 rate),	 the	
Tampere	city-region	is	very	attractive	and	hence	a	rapidly	growing	region.	Consequently,	there	
will	be	both	private	and	public	 investments	worth	more	 than	six	billion	euros	 in	 the	next	10	
years.	The	Smart	Tampere	programme	aims	at	shaping	those	investments	to	serve	the	devel-
opment	of	the	smart	city.	This	kind	of	development	approach	also	gives	new	positions	to	dif-
ferent	actors.	Universities,	for	example,	cannot	work	only	for	themselves	if	they	want	to	par-
ticipate	in	the	programme;	their	activities	should	be	related	to	the	big,	local	challenges.		
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FIGURE	3.	Roles	of	the	city	in	the	‘smart	city	ecosystem’		
(Source:	http://growsmarttogether.fi/about/city-of-tampere-ecosystem-role).	
Since	 long	before	the	programme-based	development	 led	by	the	city-organisation,	 there	has	
also	been	a	strong	emphasis	on	fostering	start-ups	and	seeking	out	novelty.	The	development	
of	different	kinds	of	open-innovation	platforms	has	been	one	of	the	core	instruments	in	carry-
ing	out	this	new	policy.	Currently,	there	is	a	plethora	of	different	kinds	of	platform	(e.g.	Uusi	
Tehdas/New	Factory,	HealthHub,	ITS-Factory,	Smacc	and	Y-Kampus).	The	whole	concept	of	an	
‘open-innovation	platform’	is	somewhat	fuzzy	despite	many	attempts	to	define	it.	Raunio	et	al.	
(2016:	5)	emphasise	three	key	points.	First,	on	platforms,	activities	focus	not	on	the	research	
teams	of	large	companies	and	universities	but	on	small	companies	and	individuals,	such	as	citi-
zens	or	students.	Second,	platform	orientation	is	realised	through	the	engagement	of	digitali-
sation,	open	innovation	and	user	orientation	in	the	development	of	city	services	and	business	
life.	 Third,	 in	 platform-based	 activities,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 quick	 experiments	 and	 agile	 piloting,	
instead	of	multi-year	development	projects	 led	by	 large	 companies	 and	 implemented	by	 re-
search	institutions	and	a	few	corporate	partners.		
However,	 in	Tampere,	 the	universities	 seem	 to	be	 involved	 in	 the	activities	of	 these	new	
open-innovation	platforms.	That	is	only	natural,	because	their	competences	and	skilled	people	
are	 still	 needed,	 even	 if	 the	way	 to	 conduct	 the	development	 and	 innovation	processes	 has	
changed.	Furthermore,	the	universities	themselves	have	initiated	a	common	process	aimed	at	
establishing	a	new	higher	education	institute	(‘Tampere3’)	by	combining	the	existing	ones	and	
creating	new,	modern	procedures	for	research,	education	and	societal	engagement.	This	pro-
ject	has	been	seen	as	one	of	the	key	issues	when	considering	the	future	of	Tampere.	The	new	
higher	education	institute	needs	to	be	more	attractive	and	progressive	than	the	existing	ones	
and	it	should	work	as	‘a	smart	university	in	a	smart	city’.	In	sum,	the	majority	of	the	recent	lo-
cal	policy	programmes	and	actions	seem	to	contribute	to	the	(constructed)	regional	resilience	
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by	 diversifying	 the	 local	 industrial	 base,	 encouraging	 entrepreneurship	 and	 (re)building	
knowledge	competences.	
6 Discussion:	Towards	constructed	resilience?		
This	article	presents	 the	case	of	 the	evolution	of	 the	Nokia-led	 ICT	 industry	 in	Tampere.	The	
focus	has	especially	been	on	the	role	of	the	universities,	other	public-sector	organisations	and	
development	policy	actions	in	this	respect.	The	theoretical	point	of	departure	has	been	a	two-
fold	one.	 First,	we	used	 the	 concepts	of	 path	 creation,	 path	extension,	 path	 exhaustion	 and	
path	branching	in	order	to	point	out	the	most	meaningful	phases	in	the	history	of	the	local	in-
dustry.	Second,	we	commented	on	those	phases	from	the	perspective	of	resilience.		
In	Tampere,	 the	 resilience	 capacity	 seemed	 to	be	 rather	high	 in	 the	1990s,	when	 the	 ICT	
path	was	created	and	the	system	was	in	a	flexible	and	creative	state.	By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	
Nokia	and	mobile	phones	had	achieved	tremendous	growth	and	had	established	their	role	as	
an	engine	of	economic	development	in	the	Tampere	region.	Tampere	entered	a	stage	of	seem-
ingly	successful	path	extension	in	the	first	years	of	the	21st	century.	Simultaneously,	however,	
the	 resilience	 of	 the	 local	 economic	 system	had	 started	 to	 deteriorate,	with	 its	 growing	 de-
pendence	on	one	actor.	The	first	signs	of	trouble	and	path	exhaustion	in	the	mobile	phone	in-
dustry	 started	 to	 emerge	 around	 2008.	 The	 real	 crisis	 and	mass	 redundancies	 took	 place	 in	
2011	and	mobile	phone	development	in	Tampere	ended	in	2016.		
There	was	 a	 growing	 emphasis	 on	 constructing	 resilience	 from	 the	 first	 signs	 of	 path	 ex-
haustion	but	the	most	active	measures	of	adjustment	were	introduced	in	2011	and	after.	Path	
extinction	in	Tampere	can	be	described	as	creative	destruction.	A	new,	versatile	ICT	business	
started	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 ashes	 of	Nokia	 and	Microsoft.	 The	 diversification	 of	 ICT-related	
industries	has	increased	regional	resilience	and	Tampere	has	entered	a	phase	of	path	branch-
ing.	The	relationship	between	path	phase	and	resilience	can	be	understood	in	the	context	of	
adaptive	cycle	models	(e.g.	Gunderson	and	Holling	2002;	Davoudi	2012:	303).	In	adaptive	cy-
cles,	the	phases	of	growth,	conservation,	creative	destruction	and	reorganisation	vary	cyclical-
ly.	This	has	a	clear	resemblance	to	path	stages.	Davoudi	(2012:	303)	has	shown	how	resilience	
varies	in	different	phases	of	the	cycle:	resilience	is	greatest	after	creative	destruction	(in	path	
creation/branching)	and	 lowest	at	 the	conservation	phase	 (in	path	extension).	An	 interesting	
result	of	our	research	is	that	these	cycles	can	be	surprisingly	fast	in	new,	knowledge-based	in-
dustrial	regions.	
Resilience	is	a	character	of	a	certain	region	or	industry.	We	argue	that	it	 is	not	entirely	an	
inherent	feature	and	that	different	regional	actors	and	policies	can	contribute	to	it	significant-
ly.	 The	 institutional	 settings,	 governance	 structures	 and	 policy	 actions	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 re-
gions’	capacity	to	resist	and	respond	to	change.	In	other	words,	resilience	can	be	constructed.	
This	view	has	been	neglected	to	some	extent,	which	 is	somewhat	curious	because	there	 is	a	
huge	body	of	literature	on	competitiveness	policies	and	the	‘construction	of	competitiveness’.	
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Still,	 in	the	current	economic	environment,	the	characteristic	of	resilience	seems	 increasingly	
relevant.	The	ability	of	a	region	to	adapt	to	change,	be	it	positive	or	negative,	on	its	own	basis	
is	of	great	importance	(e.g.	Bristow	2010;	Wolfe	2010;	Bristow	and	Healy	2014:	100).		
The	rapid	restructuration	of	the	ICT	industry	in	Tampere	has	been	a	major	learning	experi-
ence	on	two	different	levels	or	time-scales	(cf.	Bristow	and	Healy	2014:	100).	First,	managing	
the	acute	crises	 caused	by	massive	 lay-offs	or	divestments	has	 taught	 the	key	policy-makers	
what	to	do	and	how	to	do	it.	Nokia	and	Microsoft	have	been	unique	cases	in	this	respect,	be-
cause	their	social	responsibility	has	been	quite	high,	due	to	many	factors.	Still,	the	role	of	pub-
lic	policy	actions	cannot	be	deprecated.	The	key	 lesson	in	this	respect	 is	the	open,	collabora-
tive,	 trust-based	and	 informal	–	but	still	decisive	–	way	to	act.	This	way	of	acting	would	pre-
sumably	 be	 beneficial	 in	 local	 economic	 development	 work	 in	 general.	 The	 challenge	 is	 to	
maintain	that	kind	of	spirit	when	the	acute	crisis	is	over.	Second,	the	restructuration	of	the	ICT	
industry	has	been	a	great	lesson	for	anticipatory,	long-term	policies.	The	ICT	industry	in	Tam-
pere	did	very	well	for	a	long	time	and	was	highly	competitive.	Still,	as	history	has	demonstrat-
ed,	it	is	easier	than	ever	to	lose	a	competitive	edge	in	the	global	economy.	Consequently,	it	is	a	
notable	economic	risk	for	a	city-region	to	rely	on	highly	specialised	industries	that	are	too	de-
pendent	on	only	a	few	large	companies.	The	branching	part	of	the	Tampere	story	emphasises	
the	diversification	of	the	business	structure	(e.g.	start-ups),	openness	to	innovation	(e.g.	inno-
vation	 platforms),	 a	 more	 thematic	 approach	 (e.g.	 ‘smartness’,	 smart	 city)	 and	 the	 active	
search	for	new	development	paths.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	development	work	would	have	
previously	been	of	low	quality	or	illogical.	It	made	perfect	sense	in	those	conditions,	but	now	
the	requirements	are	different.		
Universities	have	had	a	significant	role	 in	the	different	development	phases	of	 the	 ICT	 in-
dustry	in	Tampere.	To	begin	with,	we	argue,	the	whole	cluster	would	not	have	emerged	with-
out	the	initial	efforts	by	both	scientific	universities.	That	is	also	the	case	concerning	the	rapid	
growth	and	the	‘glory	days’	of	Nokia	and	its	mobile	phone	business.	At	that	time,	both	educa-
tional	 and	 research	 activities	 were	 of	 great	 importance.	 However,	 quite	 intense	 university–
industry	interaction,	between	Nokia	and	TUT	in	particular,	was	unable	to	prevent	the	dramatic	
restructuration	 of	 the	 local	 industry.	 One	 could	 even	 argue	 that	 the	 relationships	were	 too	
tight,	or	at	least	that	mental	models	were	too	homogenous.		
Later,	the	universities	were	 involved	 in	the	management	of	the	acute	crisis,	but	their	role	
cannot	be	regarded	as	crucial.	Currently,	in	the	phase	of	path	branching,	the	universities	need	
to	 reorient	 themselves	 to	 the	 new	 setting.	 For	 example,	 the	 ‘open-innovation	 platform	 ap-
proach’	places	universities	in	a	quite	different	position	to	that	of	the	more	traditional	methods	
of	 university–industry	 interaction.	 Still,	 on	 the	 more	 general	 level,	 the	 role	 of	 universities	
seems	 to	be	more	 important	 than	ever.	Universities	are	actors	of	 local	 talent	attraction	and	
development.	The	current,	more	open	innovation	paradigm	and	start-up	scene	call	for	young,	
bright	people	who	are	willing	to	explore,	experiment,	fail	and	meet	with	success	like	no	previ-
ous	generation.		
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